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The elimination of "waste, fraud, and abuse" from American medicine is
not a quick or easy solution to the challenge of rising medical care costs.
Although there are clearly some savings available, particularly in the area of
administration, they likely amount to far less than many policymakers hope.
Many ofthe policy options available for reducing excesses face significant
political hurdles or involve value judgments about non-quantifiable issues
involving quality of care. Other alternatives seem as likely to bar necessary
medical care as to eliminate abuses. In some instances, particularly those
involving consumer fraud, a crackdown may merely shift costs without saving
any money. Finally, a number ofthe suggestionsfor trimming waste and abuse
involve ethical and moral judgments that Americans have yet to acknowledge
and, in any event, may not wish to sign over to the government or any other
third party.
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1. The Overview
A. Pork or Prosciutto?
In most economic transactions defining "waste" or "abuse" involves
relatively simple cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit calculations. But in medical
care this task is greatly complicated by the use of averages to make judgments
about individual cases, and by the difficulties in estimating both costs and
benefits.
In medical care, benefit calculations are fraught with both scientific and
ethical uncertainty, in part because the "benefits" of medical care are not
particularly well-defined. For example, one recent clinical study concluded that
ultrasound examinations during pregnancy have no overall health benefit, but
that judgment rests on the presumption that a patient's peace of mind has no
value.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the reaction to Oregon) decision to
establish a priority list for Medicaid procedures, assigning specific values to
medical procedures raises ethical questions that American society has yet to
resolve. Legislators often say of appropriations battles that "one man's pork is
another man's prosciutto." Similarly, one person's wasteful medicine may be
another's miracle cure.
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Fundamentally, the issue of medical waste requires a societal decision
about whether we prefer to risk harmful undertreatment or wasteful
overtreatment. It is easy to oppose waste. It is a far harder task to do so when
the alternative is denial of necessary medical services.
B. The Dead and Dying
The ethical questions surrounding potential overuse of medical care
services are perhaps most difficult in relation to those patients, often elderly,
who appear near death. Numerous studies document the disproportionate
amount of medical care expended on those in the final months of life. High
intensity medical interventions for this group often do little more than prolong
a low quality of life, while adding pain, suffering, and expense. By the same
token, one would expect younger and healthier patients to consume fewer
resources than the elderly and the critically ill.
More significantly, research suggests that we know less about probable
outcomes than we might imagine. Studies show that the largest portion of
medical care outlays goes to those who defy the averages, specifically patients
not expected to die but who do, and those expected to die but who in fact
survive. It is difficult to imagine a system that could neatly root out "waste"
of this nature, and the question of who will decide what care we eliminate is
not a frequent subject of political debate.
C. Managed Care: Eliminating Waste or Reducing Quality?
Many experts and the Clinton Administration presume that "managed care"
is the best response to the overutilization of services and the excessive
administrative costs that supposedly account for much of the waste and abuse
in American medicine.
Some forms of managed care, such as HMOs, do indeed have the potential
to reduce costs significantly. The HMO is both the provider of services and the
insurer. It cannot collect additional fees if it exceeds its budget, and it therefore
has an enormous incentive to keep care within its budget. Studies suggest that,
in some instances, HMOs may reduce hospital use by 40% and total spending
by 25%. However, the need to align services with a preset budget may also lead
to queuing and creates incentives to bar access to specialists and expensive
medical technology.
Alternative forms of managed care appear to have less impact on costs.
Pre-certification and concurrent review of hospitalizations appear to generate
savings of about 8% on in-patient hospital costs and 4-5% on overall medical
expenditures. Other forms of managed care, such as individual practice
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associations (lPAs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), seem to have
little effect on costs.
What's less clear is whether the cost savings are purchased at the expense
of technical quality and patient satisfaction. Surveys show HMO patients are
less satisfied with their care than non-HMO patients and are particularly
unhappy about excessive waiting time and being shuttled from physician to
physician because of medical staff turnover or changes in their own medical
needs, The $200 billion question is whether HMOs and other managed care
arrangements that constrain costs are eliminating waste or merely limiting
access to needed services.
D. Technology: Curse or Cure?
The American fondness for wanting "the best money can buy" seems to
apply to medicine, and many commentators believe it accounts for a significant
share of the nation's rising health costs. There is no doubt that American
medical facilities possess more hi~-technology equipment than their
counterparts in the rest of the world and that this equipment is used at a much
higher rate. Once the technology has been acquired, it will be put to use. There
is little doubt that acquisition and use of such equipment adds short-term costs.
'But it is less clear that overutilization of technology is motivated simply
by the quest for profit. Rather, American culture promotes aggressive
intervention and places a premium on professionals' being at the cutting edge
of their fields. The reliance on third-party payments to finance medical care
strengthens patients' own bias towards using whatever methods are available
when their health is at stake. And fee-for-service payments to physicians further
support technological overkill.
The United States needs to put in place incentives for cost-reducing
technology to balance the high rewards for innovation that increases costs. But
the debate over medical technology, like so much else in the medical care
puzzle, also turns in part on value judgments about costs and benefits. Some
argue strongly that high technology medicine is high quality medicine, not
waste. If technology in fact increases the quality of care, it becomes far harder
to cut waste by discouraging the use ofcutting-edge equipment and medication.
E. Administration: Cutting Paperwork Will Save Money
There are obviously big savings available from cutting paperwork in
insurance claims, billing, underwriting, processing, and marketing. Government
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid spend just $29 per person on
administration, compared to $150 per person in the private system, and per
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capita costs in the United States are six times higher than they are under
Canada's single-payer national health insurance system.
Administrative savings will require significant changes in the way
America's private insurance system operates, with the greatest savings achieved
by a system that eliminates pri,:,ate insurance and replaces it with a wholIy
public program. The managed competition approach favored by the Clinton
administration could also achieve savings by bringing uniformity to claims
processing and billing. It would not save as much as a single-payer system,
however, because insurance companies would continue to expend large sums
on marketing.
. F. Fraud, Malpractice, and Cost-Sharing
Clearly, the elimination of outright fraud and abuses such as "unbundling"
and "upcoding" would generate genuine savings. But it is unclear how much
money is at stake or precisely how to eliminate such practices. There is no
empirical evidence to support the popular notion that fraud and abuse add about
10% to U.S. medical costs. Moreover, the degree of monitoring necessary to
eliminate alI fraud would affect privacy, professional autonomy, and other
rights Americans hold dear.
It is also not at alI certain that the practice of defensive medicine as a
means to limit legal liability for malpractice significantly adds to medical costs.
While the American Medical Association believes fear ofliability may add $12-
13 billion in costs each year, there is at least as much reason to believe fear
of litigation holds down medical costs by discouraging risky, and expensive,
medical intervention. Further, there is substantial evidence that the current
system massively undercompensates most victims of medical negligence. A
reform that limits the exposure of medical providers, while also addressing the
undercompensation issue may produce little, if any, net savings.
FinalIy, some analysts argue that medical costs could be reduced
significantly by stripping away some of the insulation of third-party payments
and requiring individuals to share directly the expense of medical treatment.
Cost-sharing, through either higher deductibles or co-payments, does appear
to reduce use of medical services. However, utilization of service appears more
closely tied to economic status than to medical needs. Cost-sharing is just as
likely to discourage appropriate medical treatment as inappropriate treatment.
Cost-sharing saves dolIars, but it also eliminates beneficial use of medical
resources-an exchange that may represent an undesirable public policy
outcome.
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Many seem to believe that the elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse in
American medicine would, virtually by itself, finance universal health
insurance. Excessive administrative costs, unnecessary procedures, inadequate
consumer vigilance, unavailability of preventive care, and skyrocketing
malpractice premia all suggest an extraordinarily wasteful allocation of the
enormous resources American society devotes to medical care. Charts 1 and
2 on the following pages show graphically the seemingly inexorable rise in U.S.
health expenditures as a percentage of the gross domestic product, and the
striking disparity between the U.S. health expenditures and those of other
GECD countries.
Why is medical care in America so inefficient? Why do we not read
similar stories about waste, fraud, and abuse in the consumer electronics
industry, or the market for processed food, or the college education system?
In most markets, we expect providers who are fraudulent, abusive, or wasteful
to be driven mercilessly from business by service-conscious and cost-conscious
consumers, or put behind bars. Consumers who waste resources forgo. the
purchase of other desired goods, and thus have every incentive to smarten up.
Why is medical care different? Commentators have suggested three ways
in which medical care differs from other services and have noted some probable
consequences of these differences. First, the uncertainty of the need for medical
care, coupled with the devastatingly high cost of treatment, creates a vigorous
·demand for health insurance. Less than one quarter of healthcare payments are
"out of pocket." Second, the community's interest, both in the prevention of
the spread of contagious diseases and in compassion for those unable to pay
for care, leads to substantial public subsidies for medical care and health-related
research and development. In other words, we want sick or injured patients to
receive care regardless of ability to pay, and we want research to constantly
expand the frontiers of medical science. Finally, the uncertain and asymmetric
nature of medical information leads to licensure of health professionals and
facilities and reliance on these fiduciary providers to guide consumer choice.
We really don't know what to buy, and must trust the seller to tell us.
These differences between medical and other markets give rise to many
of the areas in which waste, fraud, and abuse are thought to occur: restrictive
licensure, supplier-induced demand, overuse of specialists and high-tech
medicine, excessive administrative costs, skyrocketing malpractice premia and
defensive medicine, herculean efforts to prolong life, and outright fraud.
Unfortunately, there are few neat ways of surgically striking out (or measuring,
for that matter) waste, fraud, and abuse in medical care. Chemotherapy, or
perhaps carpet bombing, is a better analogy: wiping out the bad means risking
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injury to the good. Solutions such as increased patient cost-sharing, managed
care, supply controls, and public rationing will all run this risk.
Nevertheless, reform is important. Wherever pos'sible, waste, fraud, and
abuse should be removed. But not throwing the proverbial baby out with the
bathwater requires attending to two tasks. One is achieving a more precise
understanding of just how fraud; abuse, and waste manifest themselves in
American medicine. The other is clearly comprehending the myriad contexts
in which these terms are employed. Indeed, clarifying the importance of fraud,
waste, and abuse requires not only that we give determinate meaning to those
terms, but also that we ask questions such as "by whom" and "in relation to
what." Finally, if an analysis of fraud, waste, and abuse is to clarify policy
debates about the reform of American medical care and its financing, analysts
must appreciate the uncertainties of medical practice and the scarcity of
important evaluative data.
Accordingly, our analysis begins with a simple characterization of fraud,
waste, and abuse. It then illustrates (I) the differing implications these terms
have for cost reduction depending upon whose conduct is said to be fraudulent,
wasteful, or abusive and (2) the varying policy contexts within which fraud,
waste, and abuse can be identified and perhaps eliminated. The discussion then
provides and comments on existing estimates of unnecessary costs resulting
from these three causes. As will become clear, any serious analysis must
highlight the uncertainties that surround the measurement of fraud, waste, and
abuse in American medical care.
A. Distinguishing Fraud, from Waste, from Abuse
Fraud is in many ways the simplest concept to define. Classic fraud
involves the misrepresentation of relevant facts combined with the detrimental
reliance on that misrepresentation by another party to the transaction. Many
applications of the fraud concept are straightforward. Medical care
professionals, for example, commit a fraud when they misrepresent the nature
or the scope of the services they provide to increase the level of compensation
they receive-whether from an individual or a third party payor (such as a
public or private insurer). Some misrepresentations fall more clearly within the
scope of"fraud" than others. Billing for procedures never performed or patients
never treated is clearly fraudulent, as is hiding a mother's assets to qualify her
for Medicaid reimbursement of nursing home costs.
In contrast, "abuse" is often used to describe instances of profligate
spending on medical care that is at the margin of fraudulent practice, in which
the conduct in question is permitted by the existing arrangements for medical
care provision and financing. The borderline between "fraud" and "abuse" is
. as a consequence inherently hazy. Some instances of abuse are probably frauds
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in euphemistic dress. Consider, for example, the psychiatrist who bills Medicaid
for a "consultation" because on her way to another appointment, she spent a
minute speaking with an institutionalized patient in the corridor, and inquired
about the patient's condition. The psychiatrist will have observed the patient's
manner (momentarily) and she may even later have dictated a note for the
patient's record. But this casual encounter is hardly what a sensible person
would consider a psychiatric consultation. A jury might or might not convict
this doctor of fraud, but the conduct is surely abusive.
Indeed, the possibilities for abusive behavior by providers are virtually
limitless. Insisting on multiple visits where one is sufficient is an oft-told tale
of medical abuse. Unbundling procedures into separate activities that are billed
independently at a higher total cost is also thought to be common. Pursuing
every diagnostic procedure conceivably relevant to a worker's compensation
case, as an accommodation to patients (or their attorneys) seeking to bolster
recoveries, is another form of overutilization of American medical care that
many believe to be abusive. Common to all of these cases is some plausible
medical explanation for the procedure. Abuse lies in the motivation imputed
to the provider, in the suspicion that costs were increased for purposes related,
at best, only tangentially to producing a better medical result. But, strictly
speaking, these are not instances of fraud. The tests or procedures or
examinations were done, and the appropriate billing codes were used to seek
reimbursement.
Consumer abuse shows a similar pattern. Patients who purchase
prescription analgesics because they are covered by a pharmaceutical insurance
plan inflate medical care costs unnecessarily and abusively when they know that
a cheaper non-prescription analgesic would be as effective. Compliant
physicians are accomplices to this abuse. Patients who transfer assets or who
limit their hours of work in order to maintain Medicaid benefits may similarly
be regarded as abusing the system:Note, however, that such "eligibility" abuses
mayor may not significantly affect aggregate health expenditures. They may
be "cost-shifting" rather than "cost-enhancing" abuses, a topic to which we
return below.
Abuse merges almost imperceptibly into waste. The surgeon who requires
both a six-week and a six-month postoperative examination may be abusing the
system. If he does not believe that a six-month examination is necessary, even
if the patient or the insurer is willing to pay for it, the surgeon is clearly
abusing the system. On the other hand, the physician may simply have different
beliefs than some of his colleagues about the efficacy of, or the need for, a
follow-up examination. One can properly describe his conduct as wasteful only
if by some objective standard the costs ofthis extra follow-up visit do not equal
the benefits that flow from it. An objective basis for identifying waste might
be a carefully controlled test comparing medical outcomes with and without
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six-month postoperative examinations. Or, it might follow from the dominant
beliefs of the medical community as evidenced by the behavior of the majority
of surgeons.
The criteria for identifying waste, whatever the methodology, are of at
least two types: "cost-effectiveness" and "cost-benefit" tests. Cost-ineffective
medical interventions are simply ones that produce, on average, no better
medical results than some cheaper treatment. A procedure that fails the cost-
effectiveness test will also be comparatively less cost-beneficial than alternative
procedures-its ratio of costs to benefits will be lower. But interventions may
also fail a cost-benefit test if, whatever their superiority to other modes of
treatment, they nevertheless fail to produce benefits that on average exceed their
costs.
A moment's reflection on these standard definitions, however, reveals why
methods of identifying waste are likely to be highly controversial. The urologist
who resects a hypertrophic prostrate, without first attempting to relieve the
symptoms through available medications, is probably wasteful by both cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit standards. The same symptomatic relief might
have been achieved at significantly less cost through pharmaceutical rather than
surgical intervention. If similar results are available at lesser cost, the cost-
benefit ratio of prescribing pharmaceuticals is lower than that of engaging in
surgery.
The controversial nature of these judgments arises from two sources. One
is the problem of using averages to make judgments about individual cases; the
other is the difficulty of estimating both the costs and the benefits of treatment.
With respect to the prostatectomy example, it might well be cheaper in the long
run to do a surgical resection for a fifty-year-old patient than to keep him on
Hytrin for thirty years-and perhaps have to do a resection anyway if the ,drug
loses its efficacy over time. The resection might also remove precancerous
tissue that would have eventually made surgery necessary. But cost-
effectiveness, on average, tells us little about waste in particular cases. Where
patient circumstances are widely diverse rather than closely similar, an
apparently straightforward cost-effectiveness analysis based on averages may
be quite misleading.
Cost-benefit analyses of waste are even more treacherous. Even where
costs are relatively straightforward, benefits calculations are often fraught with
both scientific and ethical uncertainty. In part, this is because the "benefits" of
medical care are not well-defined. Effects on mortality or morbidity rates may
be relatively clear, but these gross indicators often have little discriminatory
power.. Everything from complete inaction to major surgery may produce
similar statistical correlates. Finer-grained evaluative criteria are needed, but
appraising the effects of medical interventions on physical and mental comfort,
or on functional capacity, is both laborious and uncertain. The current
465
HeinOnline -- 11 Yale J. on Reg. 466 1994
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 11:455, 1994
controversy over ultrasound examinations during pregnancy is a good example
of this point. A recently reported clinical trial found no medical benefits.
Eminent obstetricians immediately denounced the report as clinically useless,
however scientific its methodology, because it failed to place any value on the
patients' peace of mind during pregnancy.
Moreover, the assignment of dollar values to even the more clear-cut
morbidity/mortality estimates raises serious ethical questions. Disputes over the
recent Oregon priorities list for Medicaid procedures reveal deep divisions about
the value to be placed on prolonging life and relieving symptomatic discomforts
or functional limitations. As legislators are wont to say about criticisms of the
appropriations process, "one man's pork is another man's prosciutto." With
respect to medical procedure waste, one person's squandering of medical
resources may be another's miracle cure.
This is not to conclude that we lack clear instances of waste. For example,
the administrative expense of billing and accounting for individual payors is
wasteful when clearinghouse procedures, simplified medical reimbursement
forms, or single-payor systems would eliminate a substantial portion of these
expenses. And, it is difficult to believe that the extraordinary rates ofdiagnostic
testing for worker's compensation claims-at nine times the average rate for
injuries and illnesses ofpersons outside worker's compensation-representsome
special medical necessity in the worker's compensation system. The same might
be said of the dramatically higher utilization rates of physician-owned
diagnostic testing equipment in comparison to the rates where there is no self-
referral. For policy analysis, however, the important point to understand is that
"waste" comes in even more guises than "abuse." Therefore, it is important
to focus on the form of waste and how it is measured. Where the conception
of waste is problematic, public policy confronts questions about what risks it
wishes to run-whether it prefers to run risks of harmful undertreatment or of
wasteful overtreatment-more than simple judgments about whether and where
to eliminate waste. Constructing incentives for providers or patients to use the
exact amount of medical treatment that is cost-beneficial or cost-effective is
an unrealistic ambition. Being "against waste" is easy. Deciding how to
eliminate it when the alternative risk is underprovision of medical services is
much more challenging.
B. By Whom and about What
Analyzing the impact of fraud, waste, and abuse in medical care
expenditures must move beyond sorting out differences among these concepts
and clarifYing the difficulties of their application. The questions of who makes
use decisions, and about what, are also highly relevant to whether real savings
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are available from a concerted attempt to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse from
the medical system. The following examples illustrate this point.
Provider fraud almost always generates unnecessary medical expenditures.
In the obv,ious case, payment was made for something that wasn't done. By
contrast, consumer fraud often concerns insurance eligibility rules. The question
then is who pays, not whether care was received and payment made (or left
uncompensated notwithstanding its real resource cost). Consumer fraud may
also generate medical services that ought to be eliminated. Where consumers
would forgo treatment if they had to pay for it-not because of lack of funds,
but because of the uncertainty of perceived benefits in relation to cost-a fraud
that shifts the treatment cost to a third party produces unnecessary expenditure.
But frequently the only question is whether the cost shows up in a state or
federal budget, the budget of a private insurance company or a self-insured
employer, or the uncompensated-care/bad-debt ledger of a medical provider.
Hence, while the total cost of provider fraud in the system could probably be
eliminated, any figure representing consumer fraud on Medicaid, Medicare, or
private insurers vastly overstates the amount that fraud is adding to medical
costs.
There is a similar distinction between provider and consumer abuse.
However, it is trickier to measure the costs of provider abuse than provider
fraud. If doctors in hospitals were prevented from disaggregating procedures
to maintain or increase their incomes, they might nevertheless have the political
and economic power to recoup some or all of their losses by renegotiating the
fees for the aggregates. If so, figures representing total billing abuse
significantly overstate the real savings available from its elimination.
The overestimation of savings through the elimination of abuse are
nowhere better illustrated than in the widespread belief that there are huge
savings to be gained from reforming our malpractice liability system. Contrary
to popular belief, the so-called "defensive medicine problem" is extremely
complex. The medical profession itself regularly blames overutilization of
diagnostic procedures and overcautious scheduling of repetitive medical
encounters on the fear of malpractice charges. But it is extremely difficult to
gauge the separate effects of this claimed anxiety from the effects of the general
culture of medical training and practice in the United States-a culture that
promotes aggressive intervention and extensive use of expensive technology.
Not only is the "malpractice-made-me-do-it" claim self-serving, but it may also
be objectively irrational. There is very little evidence that physician
defensiveness effectively protects against lawsuits.
Finally, any malpractice reform should take account of the substantial
evidence that the current malpractice system massively undercompensates the
victims of medical negligence. It is hard to imagine a reform that eliminates
"pot of gold" malpractice litigation but does not simultaneously establish a
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worker's compensation-like system for compensating-at lower levels-the
many victims of medical negligence who now receive nothing through the tort
system. In short, there is little reason to believe that malpractice reform will
cause the total costs of compensation to go down or that increased
compensation costs will be more than offset by a decline in defensive medicine.
The foregoing discussion is not an argument against medical malpractice
reform. It is hard to say a good word for a "compensation" system that provides
neither effective deterrence nor adequate compensation-and that may be
driving up total medical costs as well as distorting career and treatment
decisions by physicians. Nevertheless, the beliefthat medical malpractice reform
will sharply reduce health expenditures could be a pipe dream.
A similar analysis can be made of the claim that the American medical
system now provides a wasteful model of "emergency room medicine" for
uninsured or underinsured persons who use the emergency room as a substitute
for primary care. There is surely merit to the idea that universally-available
primary and preventive care would eliminate many needless emergency room
visits at considerable savings. Nevertheless, eliminating this "waste" through
universal insurance for primary and preventive care may cause aggregate
expenditures to rise because of large increases in the number of primary care
encounters. I Even so, such a change may be desirable. One cannot conclude,
however, that the elimination of this "waste" will reduce the necessity for
increased levels of financing for medical care. There are clear social gains from
producing a healthier and happier population through a more cost-effective
medical system. But the effects on aggregate medical care spending from
eliminating this category of "waste" may be the opposite of the effects of
efforts directed at eliminating paperwork or administrative and accounting
waste.
C. Data. Data, Who's Got the Data?
A sensible analysis of the potential savings from reducing fraud, waste,
and abuse in American medicine must make subtle distinctions and ask
philosophical questions such as whether the reduced anxiety of those who pay
medically unnecessary visits to the doctor should be counted as a benefit. But
our analysis must also confront the absence of systematic data on, and the
prevalence of misconceptions about, many of the features of fraud, waste, and
abuse that are relevant to policy analysis. The prior discussion of malpractice
litigation and defensive medicine is an obvious case in point, but many other
commonly-accepted claims are equally problematic.
I. For a broader discussion and examination of some empirical studies on this matter, see LOUISE
B. RUSSELL, Is PREVENTION BEITER THAN CURE? (1986).
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For example, we actually know quite little about the benefits of HMO
practice versus fee-for-service medicine. Only one existing study of the
differences between HMO and fee-for-service costs could be described as
scientifically rigorous. That study is now over a decade old and makes
comparisons between systems ofprovision that may no longer exist in the same
forms. Other data on this question are highly impressionistic, to be generous.2
Hence, the estimates that are currently bandied about concerning the savings
that will result from forcing people into HMOs are unrealistic. HMO
savings-usually attributed to a gatekeeper who economizes care or to a
capitation method of payments-have been realized with respect to self-
selecting or special populations. We have no idea whether the same results can
be achieved when the policy is applied to the whole population. Although the
argument for some savings is plausible, we lack the empirical basis to conclude
that the incentives to economize that seem to be built into HMO practice result
in behaviors that dramatically reduce medical care costs when applied to the
population at large. .
A similar controversy surrounds the managed care revolution of the past
decade. There is evidence that managed care eliminates unnecessary treatment.
There is also evidence that managed care is sufficiently costly to providers,
insurers, and patients and that the savings are all but swallowed up by increased
administrative expense-some of which is not counted because it shows up in
patient time and consternation rather than on the budgets of providers and
insurers. We also know very little about whether managed care is saving rather
than shifting costs and what its effects are on the distribution of care in the
.population. If managed care shifts the availability of care in the direction of
those most capable of "working the system," it may exacerbate the inequities
of current medical care provision without having any significant impact on
aggregate costs. .
On closer examination, there are serious questions about how much fraud
one wants to eliminate from contemporary medical care. The degree of
monitoring that would eliminate all fraud would affect privacy, professional
autonomy, and other val~es in ways that would surely make it unattractive. The
IRS, for example, could recapture eleven to fifteen dollars for every additional
dollar spent more aggressively auditing American tax returns. Congress does
not appropriate funds for this intensified auditing because of political
considerations. Similar considerations limit the degree to which any class of
health reforms could eliminate fraud.
Without further discussion ofinformational uncertainties and philosophical
ambiguities, some basic lessons emerge from our analysis of fraud, waste, and
abuse in American medicine. First, we must take great caution when using the
2. "Wildly unscientific" would be a more pejorative description of the data often cited.
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relevant terms: they are both emotionally charged and highly ambiguous.
Second, the relationship between the triumvirate of fraud, waste, and abuse and
aggregate spending for American medical care is complicated. The extent of
"savings" will depend in large part on whether the analysis concentrates on the
budget of some particular payor or instead on national or jurisdictional
aggregates. Moreover, prediction of savings from the elimination of fraud,
waste, and abuse must take into account the likely increases or decreases in the
cost of solving various fraud, waste, and abuse problems. Third, even after
careful conceptual analysis, data limitations may not permit reliable estimates
of the savings to be had from particular reforms. The degree of reliability will
vary depending on the reform. Not only will deriving precise estimates be
impractical, but the potential range will also vary by orders of magnitude of
the double or triple digit variety. Finally, because these complexities are not
part of the current general public debate, discussing them in greater detail
would contribute significantly to a more realistic appraisal of reform proposals
in American medicine. It is to that task that we now tum.
III. What Do We Know?
Fraud, waste, and abuse in American medical care encompass a wide range
of practices. Rather than seeking further taxonomic clarity, the discussion that
follows analyzes some prime candidates for cost savings suggested by the fraud,
waste, and abuse literature. It provides estimates of savings where available,
and comments on the persuasiveness of the current data. As should become
increasingly clear, existing limits on our understanding make us all, at best,
sophisticated consumers ofoften conflicting rhetoric. Nevertheless, we do know
that some things are clearly wrong with current arrangements, we can estimate
their costs within a reasonable range, and we have persuasive evidence relevant
to fixing them. These simple truths should not be lost in the chaos of claims
and counterclaims about particular aspects of medical fraud, waste, and abuse.
A. Over- and Undersupply ofRelevant Professionals
One of the most confusing aspects of the medical waste issue is the debate
about the relationship between the supply of medical professionals (or medical
technologies) and the use of medical services. It is an article of faith in the
economics profession, particularly the field of microeconomics, that licensure
provisions decrease the supply of available physicians and increase their cost.
In the realm of theory, this effect is not necessarily a "waste," but rather a
misallocation of medical resources. Total expenditures for medical care may
not rise, but medical care will be undersupplied and the prices for each episode
of medical care provision will be too high. In a world where substantial
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populations are underserved by the medical care community and where access
to care is barred by cost, public policies that restrict supply and increase costs
are unattractive.
The theoretical concerns of microeconomists are echoed by many medical
providers who do not have favored professional status and are therefore wholly
or partially excluded from the medical care market: nurse-practitioners,
physician's assistants, social workers, and so on. Nurse-midwives and
chiropractors may be the most vocal of these groups. So what do we know
about the way in which licensure affects the price and quantity of medical care
services delivered?
The empirical studies of this phenomenon are so varied and contradictory
that they are difficult to characterize. The best summary we can make goes
something like this: interstate differences in the stringency of licensing
requirements tend to inhibit professional mobility and drive up fees in the most
restrictive states. The magnitudes of these effects, however, differ substantially
across professions. In the field of optometry, the most restrictive licensure
provisions may increase the cost of access to eyeglasses by as much as 33%.3
By contrast, restrictions on advertising for prescription drugs raise prices by
approximately 5%,4 and restrictions on the use of other professional personnel
may raise prices by even less. S
The magnitude of these cost increases is subject to question, but the
direction of the effect is constant across the empirical studies: restrictive
practices contribute to higher fees and higher practitioner incomes. There is
very little evidence that licensure provisions have any significant effect on the
quality of medical services.6 Similarly, professional review organizations seem
to have little effect on the competence of practitioners.7 Hence, the whole
structure of licensing may impose costs 'and no benefit. The only activities that
seem to have a clear impact on physician competence are the output review
processes that are used by hospitals (which have an incentive to engage in such
monitoring because of their own possible liability for negligence).8
The problem is that hospital requirements tend to be higher than the
standard requirements for licensure. Hence, to the extent that hospital
monitoring is effective in weeding out incompetent practitioners, it also has the
effect of further restricting supply and increasing costs. Current credentialing
3. Gary Gaumer, Regulating Health Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 62
MILBANK Q. 380,392 (1984) (citing D. HAAS-WILSON, AsYMMETRIC INFORMATION, REGULATION, AND QuALITY
ADJUSTED PRICES: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY (1984».
4. Id. at 393 (citing JOHN F. CADY, DRUGS ON THE MARKET (1975».
5. Id. at 387 (citing FRANK. A. SLOAN & BRUCE STEINWALD, HOSPITAL LABOR MARKETS, (1980»
(licensure requirements raise wages of medical personnel by 2% to 13%).
6. For a summary of research on the effects of licensure on quality, see id. at 395.
7. For a review of empirical studies on the effects of credentialing practices on the quality of care,
see id. at 397-400. .
8. Id. at 402-03.
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practices by state licensing bo~ds seem to be increasing costs while having
very little effect on the quality of patient care. Yet the possible directions for
reform are not clear. To eliminate this "waste" by imposing the higher standards
of competence that are customary for admission to practice in hospitals might
well increase both the quality of care and aggregate medical costs. The benefits
might not exceed the costs. On the other hand, deregulation of medical practice,
would be difficult politically, not only because of interest group pressures, but
also because of patients' general beliefs in the efficacy of credentialing.
In short, we may be wasting money on licensing systems, but we still
would like additional credentialing or monitoring activities, which would
increase overall costs. The need for better quality assurance is not simply a
reflection of irrational patient fears. Studies dating back to the early 1960s
reveal shockingly high incidences of preventable deaths or invalid diagnoses
in random samples of hospital-admitted patients.9 A recent and widely noted
Harvard Medical School study, conducted in New York hospitals, estimated the
percentage of avoidable adverse effects on patients at 7%. That figure is
consistent with studies in the mid-1970s of physician-inflicted injuries in
hospital settings. 10 Studies of hospital and out-patient care that included invalid
diagnoses as well as preventable injury and death among adverse effects have
found much worse performance by physicians. Estimates of inadequate care in
these studies range from 29% to 65%.11 .
Once again, credentialing may not be the remedy for this medical practice
problem. In tests comparing the diagnostic capacity of technicians and
pathologists, for example, medical technicians failed to detect evidence of
carcinoma in pap smears 30% of the time, whereas 37% of the time
pathologists failed. 12 Credentialing increases costs, but may be worth those costs
if done in ways that actually affect practice. Current licensure provisions may
be extremely wasteful, but the proper direction of reform may be towards more
stringent monitoring that would further increase costs, with a simultaneous
increase in the quality of care.
Strangely, medical economics provides an equally plausible and exactly
contrary theory concerning the relationship between supply restrictions and
overall costs. That theory holds that the cost increases in medical care are in
substantial part the result of an oversupply of medical care personnel. The claim
is that medical care violates the basic principle of microeconomics that supply
does not create its own demand. The explanation for this is that much
decisionmaking about the use of medical care is made not by patients but by
9. [d. at 395.
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REpORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIC INJURIES (1973).
II. See Gaumer, supra note 3, at 395.
12. L. Lamotte, Validation of Perfonnance Measures, Address to the American Board of Medical
Specialties Conference on Extending the Validity of Certification (March 24, (976).
472
HeinOnline -- 11 Yale J. on Reg. 473 1994
Healthcare Fraud
providers. Moreover, patients have little inct;ntive to investigate the physician's
recommendations when third-party insurers pay for treatment.
The controversy over this phenomenon of supplier-induced demand is
extremely heated, but the light in the empirical literature is rather faint.
Pioneering studies in the late 1970s suggest that there is a 0.3% increase in
surgery rates with each I% increase in the supply of surgeons. 13 Refined
methods and better data suggest that a 1% increase in surgeons increases
surgery rates only .08% (one-third of the rate previously found), but that the
effects are differentiated. Elective surgery rates increases .12%, whereas non-
elective surgery does not change in response to increases in the supply of
surgeons. Prices, on the other hand, increase 0.9% for each 1% increase in
surgeons. 14 This vivid contradiction of neoclassical economic theory is perhaps
explained' by the fact that surgeons compete for patients largely on the basis
of perceived quality, including amenities, rather than price.
Critiques and rebuttal studies suggest that there is in fact no statistically
significant increase in demand for services with increases in physician supply, IS
but these studies have been largely debunked. 16 The consensus is now that
increasing supply does increase demand, but effects are not large and must be
disaggregated by the type of service being supplied.
A recent study of trends in health expenditures and the availability of
physicians confirms the view that physician-induced demand is not a major
cause of the rise in healthcare costs in America. 17 Growth in real medical care
dollars expended per capita as well as the growth of medical expenditures as
a percentage of GNP and of GNP per capita in the aggregate has been steady
since 1930. On the other hand, the number of physicians per person has
increased at a much lower rate, and during some decades has decreased. Hence,
while the total number of medical professionals may correlate with the overall
level of expenditure, the correlation between the growth of the number of
medical professionals (defined in virtually all studies as physicians) and the
growth in health expenditures is weak.
A more plausible .theory about waste in the system related to the supply
of medical professionals holds that we do not have too many physicians, or
more generally, too many medical professionals. Rather, we have too many
highly trained or highly specialized ones. This trend toward specialization skews
13. Jerry Cromwell & Janet Mitchell, Physician Induced Demandfor Surgery,S J. HEALTH ECON.
293, 294 (1986) (citing Victor Fuchs, The Supply of Surgeons and the Demandfor Surgical Operations,
13 J. HUM. RESOURCES (Supp.) 35-56 (1978».
14. Id. at 302-05.
15. For a review of critiques of the theory of supplier-induced demand, see Roger Feldman &
Frank Sloan, Competition Among Physicians. Revisited, 13 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 239 (1988).
16. See Thomas Rice & Robert Labelle, Do Physicians Induce Demandfor Medical Services?, 14
J. HEALTH POL., POL'y & LAW 587 (1989).
17. Joseph I. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 3,8-9
(1992).
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our medical system toward invasive and expensive interventions and lJ.way from
primary and preventive care and care-giving at a low-tech level for those with
chronic illnesses and impairments.
Comparison of the rates of specialization in the United States with those
of other developed countries certainly suggests that we are very top-heavy.
Twenty-five to 50% ofphysicians in most developed nations claim some board-
certified specialty, whereas in the United States the number is 70%, and with
recent graduates, well above 80%.18 Critics of this imbalance posit that we
necessarily stint on primary and preventive care that would both improve health
and reduce costs by preventing additional disease or illness. Conversely, the
superabundance of· specialists leads to the diagnosis of "within specialty"
illnesses and the use, at high cost, of the specialty tools that are increasingly
available. If many of these highly specialized and costly interventions are
unnecessary or of limited utility, our system is creating considerable waste in
the form of misallocation of professional resources.
There appear to be no reliable estimates of the amount of "waste" this
skewing toward specialization produces in the United States. It is clear,
however, that the solution is not a simple one..The economic rewards to
specialization must be limited and the culture of medical education and medical
practice changed. Both remedies are politically difficult, and the second
involves a multi-generational effort.
The difficulties posed by the specialization issue illustrate the dispute over
the use of non-physicians as primary caregivers. To be sure, it makes sense that
routine care can be provided by persons not enormously overtrained for that
activity. On the other hand, if primary care is the gateway into the medical
system, it is the locus of critical decisionrnaking about the future paths down
which a patient travels. In short, much primary care involves diagnosis, the
most difficult part of medical practice. For that task one presumably wants the
most highly trained and experienced professionals available to the system. Any
reorganization toward de-professionalization or reduction in specialists must
proceed cautiously with these two quite different aspects ofprimary care firmly
in view. Because that is true, estimating the savings from this sort of waste
reduction is virtually impossible.
B. Oversupply and Overutilization ofHigh-Technology Medicine
Closely connected to specialization is the vexing issue of the use and
development of medical technology. Many commentators attribute a significant
portion of the rise in American medical care costs to the development and
18. Steven A. Schroeder, Physician Supply and the U.S. Medical Marketplace, 252 JAMA 373,
375 (1984).
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utilization ofhigh-technology medical devices. 19 There are four principal causes
ofoverutilization ofhigh technology medicine. First, high technology diagnosis
and curative intervention tend to be associated with specialized practice. A
country with a high proportion of specialists will have a high proportion of
doctors accustomed to using high technology medicine. Second, blatant self-
interest may be involved. The specialist who recommends a particular diagnosis
or treatment may own the relevant equipment or be a participant in its
ownership. Third, competition among doctors, and particularly among hospitals,
may tum on the use of high technology equipment. Hence, hospitals and
doctors will want to acquire such equipment and, once acquired, they will want
to use it in order to amortize its cost. The use of high technology is in this
sense simply an aspect of competition among healthcare providers. A fourth
issue is the practice of defensive medicine, a response to fears of malpractice
liability. That issue will be discussed later because it relates to overtreatment
generally, not just to overuse of high technology medicine.
The first cause of overutilization of high technology medicine,
specialization, need not detain us. Presumably it will be cured by redistribution
of medical professionals between generalists and specialists.
There is little doubt that self-referring physicians use more of certain sorts
of facilities than do independent-referring physicians. A recent study of the
California Workers' Compensation system found that self-referral increased the
cost of medical care for workers in the system for each of the three types of
services studied: physical therapy, psychometric tests, and MRI scans.20 The
costs increased, however, for different reasons. There were higher total costs
for physical therapy because more cases were referred, but costs per case were
lower. By contrast, more psychometric tests were done, and the costs per test
were higher. Finally, an independent evaluation of the appropriateness of the
scans revealed that self-referring physicians were 38% more likely than
independent-re~erring physicians to be judged to have referred a patient
inappropriately for a scan. This study, and similar 0J:les, indicate that complete
elimination of self-referral would reduce the overall cost of medical care. The
crucial question, of course, is how much of the cost due to self-referral is
"waste." For example, many believe that there is too little emphasis in
American medicine system on rehabilitative medicine and on the treatment of
mental illness. This could mean that the higher number of referrals for physical
therapy in the California study and the higher number of psychometric tests
were entirely appropriate. There was, after all, no control on the appropriateness
of these referrals. The self-referring physicians may have been getting it right,
19. See generally HENRy J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S HEALrn
CARE 26 (1991); Newhouse, supra note 17.
20. Alex Swedlow et aI., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers'
Compensation System as a Result ofSelf-Referrai by Physicians, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1502 (1992).
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while the independent-referring physicians were getting it wrong. The MRI
results are less ambiguous. Assuming that the control was correct, there was
at least 38% more waste in the referral for MRIs by self-referring physicians.
The MRI is a good example of oversupply, the third principal culprit
behind the overutilization of high technology medicine in the United States.
There are more MRI machines in California than in the whole of Canada.
Indeed, after adjustment for population characteristics, Californians undergo
51% more MRI procedures than the US national average.21 This figure is
generally believed to be the result of supply-induced demand in California. The
MRI machines have been put in place, and must be amortized. Hence their
owners, whether self-referring physicians or independent hospitals and clinics,
will tend to use them or to create incentives for their use. Indeed, in the
California workers' compensation study, fully one-third of the MRI scans
requested, both by self- and independent-referring physicians, were judged
inappropriate. At $1000 per scan, this overuse adds significant costs to the
medical care system.
It is indeed striking, when looking at foreign medical systems, to realize
that virtually every other advanced country uses highly developed controls on
investment in capital equipment, including high-technology equipment like MRI
scanners. Most students of the success other countries experienced in
constraining cost escalation ascribe a significant portion of that success to
controls over capital investment, including investment in new technology.
Once again, however, there are benefits as well as costs to allowing some
overcapacity. Overcapacity reduces queues, and queuing is not costless.
Moreover, the knowledge that one can deploy developed equipment feeds
technological innovation. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the United States has
failed to construct incentives that sufficiently reward cost-reducing technological
innovation in an attempt to counter the strong incentives to develop procedures
or devices that increase both the level of technological sophistication and the
cost of medical care.
Estimates of the excessive costs of the oversupply and overutilization of
high technology medicine range from the enormous to the insignificant. Indeed,
some commentators seem to ascribe most of the excess costs in the American
medical system to the overuse and oversupply of high technology medicine.
Studies that take this view reach their conclusion by ascribing virtually any
otherwise unexplained rise in costs to new medical technology. In short, new
technology becomes a residual that picks up all of the supposed excess expenses
that cannot be allocated elsewhere.
This position is not crazy, just not well-justified. International comparisons
provide the principal evidence for technology driven cost increases. For
21. Id at 1506.
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example, a recent study by Robert Evans finds that, per million people, the
former West Germany has 0.7 open-heart surgical units, Canada has 1.2, and
the United States has 3.3. Likewise, there are 3.7 MRI machines per million
people in the United States compared with 0.9 in the fonner West Germany
and 0.5 in Canada.
Moreover, we know that the constraints on the development and
deployment of new and expensive technologies are weak in the United States.
Our medical culture inculcates the value of being at the cutting edge of one's
field, and that often entails the use of the newest and often the most expensive
techniques. Third-party payment systems of the sort that we now employ
provide very little restraint on this cultural bias in the medical profession.
Nevertheless, one can go too far in ascribing excess costs to the American
system's penchant for the use of high technology medicine. High technology
medicine is also sometimes high quality medicine, not wasteful medicine. Some
claim that the failure to take account of the quality improvements involved in
much of our technology causes medical inflation to be overstated in the United
States. This argument challenges the equation of high technology with high
growth in costs and waste at a fundamental level. It claims that the advancing
technology is continuously raising the quality of American medical care, and
that such quality improvement goes unrecognized. From this perspective, the
growth in medical care costs ascribed to technological innovation is misplaced.
Use ofcostlier new technologies is viewed as inflationary only because we have
failed to recognize that we are getting higher quality medical care than we were
in the past.
For now, perhaps the best that can be said is that the theory that supply
of high technology medical equipment creates its own demand has some
support. Controlling or reallocating that supply may be a significant aspect of
cost containment in reforming American healthcare. As yet, however, no one
has any good estimates of how much high technology medicine is too much
or, how much additional value is being supplied to patients through its use.
C. Expenditures on the Dying
A particularly troubling area of possible overuse of medical care services
is care devoted to dying, often elderly, patients. High intensity intervention in
this area at best prolongs low-quality life, but more likely adds pain, suffering,
and needless expense to the final days (or years, in the case of the chronically
ill or brain-dead accident victim) of a patient's life. Dr. Kevorkian's suicide
machine and healthcare proxies represent the potential for removing such
malicious waste from our medical care system on a case-by-case basis.
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What do we know about the extent of such waste? Health expenditure per
capita does increase with age,22 and a large portion of Medicare funding is spent
annually on a small percentage of its clientele.23 This pattern lends credence
to the belief that we are skewing our resources not only toward the elderly and
disabled, but also toward the worst-off of that group.
Unpacking such data, however, gives reason for pause. First, we would
expect younger, healthier people to.consume fewer resources thail the elderly,
and· the sick elderly to consume more resources than their healthful
counterparts. It is not an indictment of the healthcare system that it allocates
resources to caring for the sick. Second, most of the Medicare recipients who
consume a large amount of resources in a given year either get better or die,
a fact that debunks the notion of widespread waste of the long-tenn, life-
support variety. Third, from ages 65 to 85, medical care costs are inversely
related to age, suggesting that practice patterns already reflect reduced
intervention intensity as age increases. Finally, studies show that of the large
amounts of resources devoted to the·elderly, most are spent on two sub-groups:
I
those not expected to die who do, and those expected to die who survive. This
pattern suggests that case-by-case rationing is impossible.
It is difficult to imagine a system that neatly roots out waste of this nature.
Any systematic refonn ofthe way medical providers are paid or the malpractice
code they face will, of course, influence the decisions made about care for the
dying and disabled. "Who will say no" is not, however, a frequent subject of
public political debate.
D. Excess Demand
Wasteful use of medical resources through excess supply and the demand
induced by that supply finds a counterpart in explanations of waste that focus
primarily on the demand side of the medical care equation. Excess demand
takes tWo fonns: excess demand for insurance and excess demand for medical
goods and services.
There may be an excess demand for health insurance because 'of the way
in which health insurance is supplied to most Americans. Employer-based
health insurance receives a substantial tax subsidy through both its deductibility
to the employer and the failure of the Internal Revenue Code to count health
insurance benefits as income to the employee. As a consequence, it is in the
interest of both the employer and the employee to substitute health benefits for
22. See Daniel R. Waldo et aI., Health Expenditure by Age Group, 1977 and 1987,10 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 116,118 (1989).
23. Noralou P. Roos et aI., Does a Small Minority of the Elderly Account for the Majority of
Health Care Expense?: A Sixteen-Year Perspective, 67 MILBANK Q. 347, 347 (1989); Anne A.
Scitovsky, Medical Care in the Last Twelve Months of Life: The Relationship Between Age, Functional
Status, and Medical Care Expenditures, 66 MILBANK Q. 640, 640 (1988).
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cash payments. The existence of this excess insurance may result in excess
.demand for medical goods and services because consumers who are fully-
insured do not face the costs of use at the point of service. This latter effect
is the second form of excess demand: an excess demand for medical goods and
services themselves.
Other aspects of American life may also contribute to excess demand.
Perhaps chief among these is the necessity of pursuing medical treatment or
diagnosis in order to make claims for injuries either under workers'
compensation or in the tort system. As mentioned above, those with workers'
compensation claims may receive as much as nine times,the amount of medical
treatment for the same condition as those without such claims.24
There are two broad ways of addressing excess demand. The fIrst is to
attack the causes of excess insurance. One obvious remedy is reform of the
Internal Revenue Code. In addition, managed competition proposals purport to
address this problem by forcing consumers to choose among insurance plans
that have different service and institutional characteristics as well as different
price tags. Presumably consumers will be cost conscious in their selection of
an insurance plan and will subsequently feel some of the economic effects of
medical care use because they are no longer overinsured.
The second way to address excess demand is to decrease demand for goods
and services at the point of service. The managed competition scheme relies
principally on moving most patients and providers into HMO-style medical
practice. Within the HMO, a primary care physician serves as a gatekeeper for
consumers. The cost-saving potential of this gatekeeping function is unclear.
The results of one experiment in the early 1980s suggest that gatekeeping alone
has no effect on the use and cost of care.2S On the other hand, a RAND study
in the early 1970s found 28% cost savings for the HMO group over the control
groUp.26 No similarly-controlled experiment has been done in recent years, and
because conditions of medical practice outside of HMOs have changed
significantly, these results may no longer be valid.
In addition, recent surveys reveal that HMO subscribers are less satisfied
with their care than are non-HMO patients.27 There is particular complaint about
waiting time-a cost that does not show up in the provider's budget-and about
the frustration of being shuttled from physician to physician as employees
change and the needs of the patient alter.
Very few Americans have voluntarily chosen HMO practice, and HMO
cost increases over the last two decades have paralleled those of other insurers
24. See Swedlow et aI., supra note 20.
25. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE(CBO), THE EFFECTS OF MANAGED CARE ON USE AND COsT OF HEALlli
SERVICES 13 (June 1992).
26. ld. at 8 (citing Willard G. Manning et aI., A Controlled Trial of the Effect of a Prepaid Group
Practice on Use ofServices, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1505 (1984».
27. M. Goldberg, forthcoming in Journal ofAmerican Medical Association.
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or self-insured employers.28 Hence, the efficacy of relying on differential
pricing to force HMO use, and on HMOs to constrain the costs of medical care,
is unproven. 'We will provide further analysis of this cost-saving function in
the later discussIon of managed care. .
The alternative and more direct means of dampening demand for medical
care services at the point of service is through copayments or deductibles. The
major study of cost-sharing arrangements was conducted by the RAND
Corporation between 1974 and 1982.29 The findings of that study are clear.
First, cost-sharing reduces the probability that an individual will seek care for
any particular medical condition. Unhappily, the deterrent effect is strongest
for the poor, especially poor children, who were at least 40% less likely to
obtain care in the RAND experiment. Second, cost-sharing deterred enrollees
from obtaining both appropriate and inappropriate medical care. Income, rather
. than health condition, determined the deterrent effect of cost-sharing systems,
and patients in the cost-sharing plans had worse outcomes for specific treatable
conditions, such as hypertension. Finally, the RAND study found that cost-
sharing may prevent or delay entry into the medical system during a particular
episode of illness. Cost-sharing does not, however, change the course of
medical care once the patient has entered the system. During any given episode,
the enrollees who had to share costs received the same services and medications
as those who did not.
The general conclusion in the cost-sharing debate seems to be that cost-
sharing saves dollars, but it is not selective about those savings. Cost-sharing
cuts out wasteful use of medical resources as well as beneficial use of medical
resources. Moreover, there are perverse distributional effects to cost-sharing at
the point of medical service.
Providers and consumers must know much more about the likely efficacy
of care, if consumers are to exercise sensible judgments when faced with cost-
sharing. In addition, cost-sharing must be carefully tailored-and thus
administratively more complex-to eliminate the pure income effects, if it is
to be a method for selectively attacking waste rather than simply limiting
access.
Finally, the experience of other countries suggests that the form of cost-
sharing is highly important. Deductibles are difficult to administer, and they
impose large administrative costs.30 Virtually all advanced societies that provide
universal care with cost-sharing have abandoned deductibles in favor of
28. CBO, supra note 25, at 20 (citing Joseph Newhouse et aI., Are Fee-for-Service Costs
Increasing Faster than HMO's Costs? 23 MED. CARE 960 (1985).
29. See generally CBO, supra note 25; Theodore R. Mannor & Michael S. Barr, Making Sense of
the National Health Insurance Reform Debate, 10 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 228,235-36 (1992) (summary
of commentary on RAND experiment).
30. See Douglas Conrad & Theodore R. Mannor, Patient Cost Sharing, in POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND
MEDICAL CARE 208 (1983).
480
HeinOnline -- 11 Yale J. on Reg. 481 1994
Healthcare Fraud
copayments. The task, then, is to target copayments in ways that eliminate
waste rather than needed care.
E. Administrative Costs
Administrative costs is one area in which there is an ample body of data
to support claims and substantial agreement concerning needed reforms. Yet
even here, one must beware of assumptions that underlie claims of waste. In
this area, most of the discussion has compared the United States' administrative
costs with those of universal healthcare plans elsewhere. There has been
particular attention to the Canadian system, which has a single payer in each
province who insures the whole population and negotiates fees and budgets with
providers. The General Accounting Office calculates that the United States
would save over $65 billion a year in insurance overhead and administrative
costs to doctors and hospitals if we adopted an analog of the Canadian system.3!
In some sense, it is appropriate to view this $65 billion per year as pure waste.
After all, if an alternative system design would eliminate the costs with no loss
of medical services or information, then the system should change.
Nor is Canada unique. A look at the OECD entries reveals that in 1990,
expenditures for medical administration approximated $150 per person in the
United States, with our closest competitor being the former West German
Republic, where per capita costs are $102.32 No other country reaches triple
digits, and'nations such as Canada and Australia expend only $23 and $38 per
capita, respectively. Perhaps more significantly, the gap between U.S. and
foreign administrative burdens has been growing, as the data for the U.S. and
Canada in Chart 3 illustrate. Major savings can be achieved by reducing
administrative costs in the American system.
It is important, however, to be somewhat more discriminating about
categories of administrative costs than are some commentators. To put the
matter slightly differently, when one speak's of administrative costs as "waste,"
one should be careful to note that these "wasteful'; expenditures relate almost
exclusively to the marketing, claims, processing, billing, uJ;lderwriting, and
regulatory-compliance arena associated with competitive private insurance. The
reason that aggregate administrative costs are lower elsewhere is usually the
absence or virtual absence of private insurance.
Germany's high administrative costs, for example, result from the
continued existence of over 700 insurance funds which are regulated in order
31. U.s. GENERAL ACCOUNllNG OFFICE, CANADIAN HEAL1ll1NSURANCE: LESSONS FOR TIlE UNmID STAlES 7
(1991).
32. Jean-Pierre Poullier, Administrative Costs in Selected IndustrializedCountries, 13 HEALTH CARE
FIN. REv. 167,170(1992).
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to produce a uniform national system. In the U.S., whereas wasteful
administrative costs account for perhaps 20% of American expenditures in
privately insured healthcare services, the administrative costs of the public
schemes, such as Medicare and Medicaid, are quite low. The per capita
administrative costs for public systems is $29 per person, whereas costs in the
private system are $150.33 That administrative costs for public insurance are
less than private insurance administrative costs by a factor of five lends
credence to the Canadian-based prediction of a 20% savings if America moves
to a single-payer system.
These numbers also confirm that not all administrative costs can be
squeezed out of any medical care system; medical care must be administered.
Moreover, it is possible that certain aspects of the system are currently
underadministered. We may not be spending enough, for example, on
recordkeeping that would permit useful comparisons. of outcomes or on the
accurate monitoring of physician and hospital performance. The current system
may also underfund healthcare planning and some aspects of health education.
A useful taxonomy of administrative costs is provided in Table 1. A shift
to a single-payer system would have major effects on the administrative costs
associated with the first and third rows in the table, but might have little impact
on the' costs associated with rows two and four. Managed competition has
significantly less power to reduce administrative costs than does a single-payer
plan. Selling and marketing costs would remain under managed competition.
In fact, attempts to provide good information to consumers might actually
increase costs related to the choice of an insurance plan. Nevertheless, there
should be some economies as small insurers drop out of the private insurance
market, because that is the sector in which adIpinistrative costs are highest.
F. Malpractice
Four factors have combined to make the malpractice debate particularly
acrimonious: rapid growth in malpractice insurance premiums, physician
misperception of the incidence of malpractice litigation, the attention given to
large malpractice awards, and the conflict between two powerful interest
groups-physicians and trial lawyers. As is often the case with acrimonious
debate, the facts and figures thrown about by the participants require careful
handling.
It is reasonably well-established that malpractice premiums have risen
rapidly during the past two decades, and they now represent appoximately 3.7%
of physician charges.34 However, averages can be deceiving. While the
33. Kenneth E. Thorpe, Inside the Black Box ofAdministrative Costs, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1992,
at 42.
34. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 2 (1991).
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average physician may pay $7,300 per year for malpractice insurance, the cost
in some sub-specialties can approach $200,000 per year.35 Hence, a cost which
is modest in the context of overall medical costs (less than 1%), can have
significant skewing effects on the price of care in particular specialties, and on
the willingness of physicians to enter or remain in those specialties.
Leaving the realm of malpractice insurance premia, the estimates of the
costs of malpractice in American medicine become very soft. Estimates range
between $1 billion and $25 billion per year, but tend to hover around $15
billion. A study by the American Medical Association (AMA) in the early
1980s published that figure, which was then revised downward to $12 billion
to $14 billion in a later study by the AMA Center for Health Policy Research.36
Although the AMA is not a disinterested party, its studies were not
irresponsible. They were, however, seriously flawed methodologically in ways
that are difficult to remedy. The fmdings are based upon the reports of
physicians who were asked to estimate either practice changes or the increased
costs that they incur due to fear of malpractice suits. Such an approach invites
doctors to focus on malpractice fears as the motivation for their practice style.
In the face of rapidly rising premiums, doctors have an incentive to overstate
the costs of procedures as well. In contrast, a more recent poll asked doctors
to list all of the factors that influence their practice routines or standards of
care. This study revealed that the possibility of malpractice litigation ranked
lower as a causal factor than a number of other influences such as continuing
medical education, medical journals, and consultation with peers.
Because physicians are influenced by many factors in designing their
practice standards, it is unlikely that we will be able to detennine the true
contribution of the fear of malpractice suits to the wasteful use of diagnostic
techniques or medical interventions. Moreover, it is possible that malpractice
litigation is producing no aggregate waste at all. The most recent and careful
study of medical malpractice found no positive correlation between the
incidence of malpractice litigation and iatrogenic injury and death, and that the
fear of malpractice causes physicians to forgo some interventions.37 In short,
the net effect of the fear of malpractice may be economically positive: it
prevents iatrogenic injury and death as well as the direct costs of certain risky
interventions.
No one who examines the American malpractice compensation system
believes that it is perfonning well. While it is something of a straw man in the
debate about costs and medical waste, the current malpractice compensation
35. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEAsURE OF MALPRAcnCE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRAcnCE LmoAll0N AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION 2 (1993).
36. Roger A. Reynolds et aI., The Cost ofMedical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987).
37. Paul C. Weiler et aI., Proposalfor Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2335 (1992).
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system is admittedly ineffective. Recent studies suggest that only a small
percentage ofpersons injured by medical negligence ever receive compensation,
that who receives compensation and in what amount is something of a lottery,
and that the administrative costs of the system (payments for litigation and
lawyers' fees) are extremely high in relation to the amount of compensation
received by plaintiffs.38 These effects, and the possibility or"skewing the
willingness of doctors to enter or remain in important fields like pediatrics,
gynecology and anesthesiology, should infonn any malpractice refonn.
Recent experience suggests, however, that refonn is politically difficult.
The image of legislators preventing injured parties from recovering from
negligent physicians is not terribly attractive to either legislators or the general
public. Moreover, the trial lawyers' associations are quite powerful at both the
state and national level. Fifteen states have begun refonn with the modest
experiment of requiring arbitration prior to filing a lawsuit. There is no
evidence to date that this change reduces costs.
The state of Maine has begun a more ambitious program under which
physicians are provided a defense to any malpractice action if they follow
guidelines developed by groups of physicians in various specialties for dealing
with particular conditions.39 The anecdotal evidence suggests that Maine
physicians generally like the experimental arrangements and that the initiative
has reduced the use of certain procedures, but that it has also increased the use
of others. There are currently no cost estimates on the savings that may be
achieved through the Maine approach.
A much more ambitious no-fault system has been proposed, but has been
enacted only in Virginia and Florida, and only for one type of
injury-neurological damage to infants during delivery.40 Such a scheme builds
on the workers' compensation model and compensates victims whose injuries
are caused by medical treatment, whether or not there is any demonstration of
fault on the part of any particular physician or institution. Recoveries are more
certain, but are limited to such items as medical costs, a percentage of lost
wages, and predetennined amounts for particular residual impainnents or death.
Institutions and physicians could be experience-rated and their insurance costs
adjusted accordingly. This adjustment would provide a financial incentive for
better or more careful medical practice, and would focus remedial attention on
those physicians or institutions that have higher risks of causing injuries to
patients.
The no-fault scheme has much to recommend it, but it probably would not
yield a reduction in the overall costs of medical care. Because a much larger
38. [d.
39. Edward Felsenthal, Maine Limits Liability for Doctors Who Meet Treatment Guidelines, WALL
ST. J., May 3, 1993, at AI.
40. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNJ1NG OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION (1992).
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percentage ofpatients experiencing adverse effects would be compensated under
such a scheme-albeit at much lower amounts-the total cost of the system
might increase. There are currently no good cost estimates for this sort of major
malpractice reform.
G. Straightforward Fraud and Abuse
We have previously provided a taxonomy of fraud and abuse, but it would
be useful to provide some examples of the sorts of fraud and abuse that have
been uncovered in recent years. Two relatively common forms of fraud and/or
abuse are "upcoding" and "unbundling." A recent example of upcoding was
discovered in California, where hospital staff routinely upgraded the codes on
patient file jackets, switching primary and secondary diagnoses to substitute
more costly procedures and services for those that were actually administered
to the patients. Because these actions were willful they were clearly fraudulent.
. On the other hand, there may be a large number of judgment calls in which
hospitals or physicians having a choice between principal diagnoses will have
an incentive to list the one that has a higher prepayment schedule. Estimates
of the magnitude of upcoding or "DRG Creep" in American medicine range
from 0% to 0.5% of healthcare expenditures ($0 to $4.2 billion in 1992), but
are somewhat overstated because they ignore accidental and systematic
"downcoding."41 In short, contrary to the conventional wisdom based on a few
horror stories, upcoding is not a big ticket item.
Fraudulent unbundling occurred when a group of Massachusetts
anesthesiologists billed Medicare separately for the insertion of intravenous lines
and catheters, although those procedures had already been reimbursed as part
of billings for overall anesthesia services. Once again, fraudulent unbundling
has many analogues of an abusive sort. Often a physician or hospital need not
bill twice, merely separately, in order to increase the fees. No estimation of the
systemwide magnitude of unbundling exists. Whether financially trivial or
tremendous, however, unbundling is professionally damaging and worthy of
reform attention.
Some of the largest instances of fraud in the medical system have involved
even more blatant activities. For example, a physician and his sons billed
Medicaid during the period of 1980 to 1987 for 400,000 phantom visits by
Medicaid patients. They had programmed the diagnostic center's computer to
generate phony claims and back-up charts for as many as 12,000 fictitious visits
a month. Another flagrant offense took place when a New York pharmacy
bought prescriptions from Medicaid recipients that it did not fill, but for which
41. David C. Hsia et aI., Medicare Reimbursement Accuracy Under the Prospective Payment
System /985 to /988,268 lAMA 896 (1992).
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it billed the state. This pharmacy, in addition, simply fabricated prescriptions
that were purportedly based on physician telephone requests.
As these cases illustrate, the opportunities for fraud and abuse in the
medical care system are quite significant. Moreover, the complexity of the
medical care system renders fraud and abuse easier for those willing to engage
in it, and its decentralization adds to the monitoring problems of federal, state
and private officials. In the Medicare context, for example, the federal
government has agreed to allow a large variety of billing practices to
accommodate local physician and hospital custom. The resulting complexity,
combined with the relative stinginess ofCongress in funding monitoring efforts
by HCFA, helps to perpetuate undetected Medicare fraud and abuse.
That there is opportunity to engage in fraud and abuse and that monitoring
resources are inadequate is generally accepted by students of the American
medical care system. Few agree on how much this behavior costs and what to
do about it. The extent of fraud and abuse in American medicine remains
undetermined. A consensus has developed in the healthcare industry that fraud
and abuse contribute roughly 10% to the total healthcare budget of the United
States.42 If current spending is approximately 800 billion dollars, then fraud and
abuse are said to account for 80 billion of that spending. This number has
become an article of faith, and no one really knows what the correct number
is.. An estimate derived by Consumer Reports is presented in Table 2 on the
following page.
Solutions to the problem of fraud and abuse are fairly straightforward.
Increased funds for monitoring, system simplification, and elimination of ,
physician self-referral are potential remedies. Each of these approaches is
currently being implemented to some degree. But no one is carefully studying
the effects of these initiatives. Of course, given that the baseline-the current
costs of fraud and abuse-has not been established with any certainty,
monitoring the effects of initiatives to reduce the level of fraud and abuse is
difficult.
With respect to the issue of fraud and abuse, political judgment is critical.
Legislatures and other officials have to decide how much they are willing to
appropriate in an attempt to eliminate fraud and abuse, how invasive they are
prepared to be with respect to monitoring, and how far they are willing to go
to simplify the system and to change provider incentives. The effects of these
measures on the level of fraud and abuse will not be easily quantified.
42. Un'ited States General Accounting Office estimate.
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Table 2
Consumer Reports Estimate of Medical Care
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H. Managed Care: Palliative or Panacea?
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If doctors and hospitals provide unnecessary care and use too many costly
high-tech procedures; if patients, because of third party payments or another
cause, demand excessive attention from the medical profession; ifadministrative
costs eat up too much of the healthcare budget, and if opportunities for fraud
and abuse are ubiquitous in the system; what is the solution to the waste, fraud
and abuse problem? Increasingly, the mantra intoned by public and private
healthcare officials and by numerous analysts is "managed care."
Because it enjoys such support among practitioners, managed care deserves
its own discussion as an answer to the waste, fraud and abuse problem. What
is managed care? What do we know about its impact on expenditures? And
how likely is it that existing'managed care methods will have beneficial effects
in a reformed American medical care system?
For purposes of cost containment, analysts usually group managed care
arrangements into several categories. Group and staff model HMOs, as
previously discussed, have been shown to produce one-time cost savings of
significant amounts. The studies are dated, however, and it is not clear that the
same percentage of savings over other arrangements would be achieved by
newer HMOs.
A universal system of managing care based upon the group and staff
model HMO would be extremely difficult to implement. First, these forms of
HMOs cannot be established in sparsely populated areas where both residents
and providers tend to be widely dispersed. For some substantial fraction of the
population this is not a feasible form of managing care. Second, it is not clear
that most Americans for whom HMOs are feasible can be persuaded to join
them unless there is no real alternative. In 27 states, less than 2% of the
population is in a group or staff HMO and in 35 states, less than 5% of the
population are HMO members.43 In short, moving to the HMO managed care
model involves shifting huge numbers of providers and consumers into an
organizational arrangement that has been available for several decades, but that
has not attracted the majority of Americans.
In any event, HMOs purportedly achieve cost savings by managing care
through primary care physician gatekeepers. As previously discussed, this
elimination of self-referral to hospital care or to specialists has substantial
savings effects in comparison to fee-for-service providers without managed care.
It is not clear, however, that the management of care is the key to HMO cost
constraint. The real key may be the capitated nature of HMO financing. The
HMO is both the provider of services and the insurer. It cannot collect
43. Goldberg, supra note 27.
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additional funds should it overrun its budget, and therefore has a strong
incentive to keep the provision of care within the budget that has been
provided. This produces the waiting and shuttling that make HMOs unattractive
to many.
A second form of managed care involves precertification and concurrent
review ofall hospitalization. This type ofcare management is considerably less
effective than the staff or group HMO model in reducing costs. Whereas the
HMO may reduce hospital use by 40% and total spending by 25%,44 pre-
certification and con.current utilization review has been found to reduce
inpatient hospital costs by only 8% and overall medical expenditures by 4 to
5%.45
While studies are inconclusive, other forms ofmanaged care (such as IPAs,
network model HMOs, point-of-service plans, and preferred provider
organizations) may have little impact on overall medical care costS.46 Some
studies have found small effects, but the amounts are negligible and may be
offset by other costs. These other forms of managed care provide amp!e
opportunities for providers to shift costs to others. As a consequence, there may
be no real saving in the aggregate, even if the population enrolled in a managed
care arrangement has reduced its overall medical care costs.
In short, group and staff model HMOs have a greater capacity than
unconstrained or unmanaged care systems to save substantial amounts of
medical expenditures. Pre-certification and concurrent review for hospitalization
have similar but lesser effects on hospitalization and overall medical care costs,
while all other forms of managed care have no demonstrable effect.
Applying effective managed care techniques to the entire population has
the potential for significant savings. As of 1990, only about 80 million
Americans were in programs that used an effective form ofmanaged care, while
nearly 180 million were in either ineffective managed care systems or
arrangements that involved no managed care at al1.47
Assuming that effective managed care could approach the upper measure
of savings of the group and staff HMO model, or 25% of current expenditures,
the $200 billion question is whether the managed care arrangements that
constrain costs are eliminating waste or merely eliminating access to needed
services. This question leads to our final topic: How can we distinguish
elimination of waste from barriers to access?
44. CBO, supra note 25, at 8.
45. Id. at 11-12. Some studies have found slightly higher savings, but it is not clear whether these
studies controlled for out-of-hospital medical care for the same patients.
46. See id. at 8.
47. Verdon S. Staines, Potential Impact of Managed Care on National Health Spending, HEALTH
AFF. (Supp. 1993) at 251.
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Many of the standard interventions now used by American physicians have
never been subjected to serious analysis of their effectiveness. Recent research
on variation in medical practice styles across localities in the United States
reveals dramatic differences in the rates at which particular diagnostic
procedures are used or curative interventions made.48 Lack of testing of the
efficacy of procedures, combined with an enormous disparity in their use,
suggest that physician judgments about interventions or diagnostic tests are
informed more by custom, professional bias, or individual economic incentive
than by the efficacy of the care provided. If those are the bases for physician
judgments, it follows that there. is substantial waste in the system.
More research is underway on the efficacy of particular medical
interventions, but a variety of technical difficulties in gathering and analyzing
data exist.49 We are gaining knowledge about the efficacy ofvarious treatments,
but we are learning slowly and not without controversy.
Serious research in the area of medical interventions is extremely
expensive, in terms of both dollars and time. "Gold standard" research results
-the double-blind clinical trial with an untreated control group-are available
for certain procedures, but the approach needed to produce them is notoriously
expensive and takes years to complete. This type of research is routinely
required for the approval of new chemical entities in the pharmaceuticals
market, and accounts for 8 to 10 year delays and $100 million cost increases
in the marketing of new chemical entities. (By the same token, of course, this
sort of testing keeps many ineffective and dangerous preparations off the
market.)
More importantly, it is unethical to use the gold standard test for many
medical interventions. It is ethically problematic to assign patients to an
existing, but perhaps less effective, form of treatment in order to get a control
group for another treatment that might be more efficacious. Patients come to
doctors to receive care, not to be used as guinea pigs in medical experiments.
And, of course, doctors have an ethical obligation to give patients the best care
that, in their judgment, can be provided.
Because of these problems, effectiveness studies must use panel techniques
to evaluate the efficacy of various medical practices. The basic idea of these
techniques is to get a cross section of experts in the field and have them
evaluate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of particular forms of
treatment. There is a significant amount of use of this method of research,
48. Janet B. Mitchell, Area Variation in Medicare Physician Spending, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1992,
at 224.
49. See, e.g., Albert L. Siu et aI., Choosing Quality of Care Measures Based on Expected Impact
and Improvement, 27 HEALTH SERVo REs. 619 (1992).
492
HeinOnline -- 11 Yale J. on Reg. 493 1994
Healthcare Fraud
including that which provides the foundation for the Maine experiment
previously described, in which following practice guidelines laid down by
expert panels provides a defense against malpractice actions.
Nevertheless, the panel technique is controversial. Not all physicians are
convinced by a decision of the panel that examines the medical records and
reaches a consensus about the efficacy or inefficacy of various interventions.
Moreover, it is difficult to find two patients who are identical in terms of their
diagnoses, other physical and psychological circumstances, and available
environmental supports. Reviews of files cannot capture all of the variables
potentially relevant to treatment decisions. Hence, a panel judgment about what
constitutes good treatment in the average case can be second-guessed every day
of the week by individual physicians treating individual, highly peculiar
patients. For these reasons, many are skeptical that we will ever have a
reasonably complete set of output measures covering most medical practices,
which could be used to distinguish between care that is beneficial and care that
s~ould be consigned to the dustbin of "waste."
From the available evidence, translating outcomes research into improved
care is fraught with difficulty. so In one study of American hospitals that had
implemented outcomes research programs, only 4 of 31 reported improvements
in quality of care as a result. s1 Systematic reform will have to provide
incentives to providers to adopt practice patterns that challenge not only their
prior experiences, but also the maintenance of their current status and income
levels.
Conclusion
Eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse in American medicine is not a
panacea. Some believe that the United States, by dealing with waste, fraud, and
abuse, can sharply reduce overall medical costs while preserving (or even
improving) access to care. Unhappily, as this Essay shows, this belief is
unproven and deeply problematic.
We know, however, that there are major problems with today's medical
care system. We can estimate-within broad ranges-their cost to patient,
insurer, and taxpayer. And we have reasonably good ideas about how to address
some of these problems. For instance, there is no question that certain costly
high-tech procedures are used too often and that a variety of reforms would
reduce the incentives behind this overuse.
50. Jane C. Linder, Outcomes Management: Compliance Tool or Strategic Initiative, 16 HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REv. 21, 23 (1991).
51. Id.
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Secondly, we know that the consolidation of purchasing power in medical
care would provide greater countervailing pressure on relentlessly rising medical
fees. Moreover, the extension of capitation methods of payment would reduce
pressures to increase the volume of services provided.
Administrative costs, as we have shown, are substantially greater in the
United States than among our economic competitors. There is no mystery as
to how we can reduce these costs significantly.
Outright fraud should be high on the agenda for reform. This is true even
though we have no precise financial measure of the extent of current fraudulent
practices.
Applying effective managed care techniques to a larger proportion of the
population has the potential to cut costs. The problem is how to pursue these
savings sensibly, while holding in check excessive expectations for their
implementation.
New research on the effectiveness of care holds promise for improving the
quality of our medical system as well as for restraining costs. Even more
importantly, such research will challenge medical professionals in beneficial
ways. It is worth pursuing even given the difficulty of quickly translating
research into improved care.
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